Greg Detre
Sunday, 14 May, 2000
for Tasioulas Mill III
Griffin � Value Judgements ch 6-7
Beyond
common sense: philosophy and the search for system
Chapter 7 �
Some complex moral ideas
Where do
moral norms come from?
Human
limitations and the problem of scope
prudential values do not show us what to do
once action is at issue, then the nature of agents is too (agent - a person who or thing
which produces an effect; (the cause of) a natural force or effect on matter)
4
determinants of norms: the good life, the limits of the will, the demands of
the social life and the limits of knowledge
prudential values e.g. enjoyment, understanding, accomplishment, deep personal relations, autonomy, liberty = long-term, life-structuring, unlike the short-term mental state/experience of classical utiliarianism
prudentially good life requires commitments, partiality, being a certain kind of person
tension between prudence and morality
these 2 parts of ethics, the demands of others and the goal of individual flourishing, must be rendered, if not entirely harmonious, at least combinable in one normative poitn of view, and in one personality
the next sections deal with the
variety of forces which shape our norms
constraints of evolution and human nature
increase people�s knowledge
behaviour modification
autonomy as essential component of morality
give people a more inspiring goal � religion�s answer
Murdoch: goals �/span> capacities
impartiality
ought we to aim only for what we can do? more importantly, ought we to try for what we can�t
capacity-blindness (Jesus: �Be ye therefore perfect�) and objective ethics
political � law, punishment etc.
psychological � education, social indoctrination
strategic moral outlook
property and economic structure
social institutions and personal commitments are often obligation-generating (and rights-bestowing)
enormous complexity of alternative social institutions, e.g. economic structure - need advances in economics, but also our understanding of how societies work, how individual psyches work, and how the one affects the other
because of the limits of our knowledge about what we can and can�t do, the picture of what a moral agent must do is somewhat arbitrary � but since the limits of knowledge are inescapable, so must the arbitrariness
the limits of knowledge leave arbitrariness and contingency a large role in determining what, morally, we should do
e.g. how much we give to charity, and the forces of
territoriality which have shaped our particular institution of property
these 4 forces shaping our norms explain a lot about common sense morality:
� permits partiality to particular persons, groups and causes
� incorporates the rights and obligations that arise from many of our social roles
� tailors moral demands to our capacities
� provides no all-embracing system for our various, apparently independent, standards (separate conditions, e.g. institution of property, relation of parent and child, role of a citzen)� no single background consideration unifies them all
it is hoped that philosophy will introduce system beyond common sense � but the same facts about agents undermiune many important ethical systems
limits of the human frame (part of can/ought???)
what about the limits of instinct/evolution? of survival/environment?
what exactly is his point in this chapter?
1 source of moral norms = individual goods
�don�t deliberately kill the innocent� � why?
because we value life?
should a surgeon then kill a recluse, just to use his organs to save 5 others?
or in the case of crashing plane, one should steer it into the countryside not a big city
why? to limit the damage
this policy: makes no great demands on knowledge and involves no ambitious programme of action (we respond whenever our hand is forced, under exceptional circumstances)
if the surgeon tries it, when their hand isn�t forced � cannot know the ramifying consequences (total benefits against total costs)
concerned with policy, not just a particular case � would require God-like knowledge if everyone worked on this basis
ought implies can � morality is constrained to the sphere of human capability, including our constrained understanding
we should opt for the most salient, obviously reasonable policy
hence �limit the damage� for the airplane, �don�t deliberately kill the innocent� for the surgeon
= the appropriate moral norms for agents constrained by physical/psychological/understanding limitations
there are no moral norms outside the boundaries set by our capacities
only in extreme cases do we set our norms aside in favour of another, more salient moral policy
can�t just be limitations on knowledge that make the surgeon�s decision to play God and transplant the recluse�s organs the wrong one
our role is to respect, not promote life
moral life is conservative
what about less obvious cases:
smother the baby so its cries won�t give away the hiding place to the Gestapo?
eat the cabin boy because he drew the short straw or has the least chance of surviving after a shipwreck
6 tourists trapped in a hole with the waters rise � the first one gets stuck � he can worm himself out slowly, but the others will die, or they can blast him out of the ground to save the others
= different from the surgeon�s dilemma, because it�s unique and cannot become policy
2 moral norms: a prohibition and a positive
instruction
but no single, ultimate principle underlying all
moral norms (e.g. utilitarianism) or any one consideration/rational requirement
(e.g. moral imperative)
criticism of direct utilitarianism: can people drop their central private or public commitments for utility calculation?
criticism of direct utilitarianism:
reply to criticism of indirect utilitarianism: impartially promoting interests is not meant as an action-guiding principle, but as the criterion of our moral practice
the capacity-blind objectivists say that the criterion in morals is independent of human capacities
if there prove to be many situations in which the calculation of utilities cannot be done to a sufficient degree of reliability, then does enough remain to be called �utilitarianism�?
we can�t answer the questions we need to to make indirect utilitarianism plausible: �what set of rules and dispositions would, if they were to prevail in one�s society, produce most utility over society at large and in the long run?�
utilitarianism turns ethics into a project that doesn�t fit the agents who are meant to carry it out
some moral norms and rleations have an authority of their own, independent of their promoting the good
but deontologists explain this by introducing a further moral standard
mysteriousness
intuition �/span> personal likes/dislikes
need standards of correctness, and an error theory for identifying prudential values and deontological standards
some deontologists identify acts that are prohibited in virtue of their kind
some identify a kind of intention, e.g. moral respect for persons
some point to the violation of a right, e.g. the right to life
need a substantive theory which shows how the right to life is infringed in the transplant case but not in the cabin-boy or pot-holing case
deontologist constraints have to be linked to interests
deontology = too ambitious, now and in the future � either attaches weights to values or requires a turning point
we must live by certain norms: prohibitions, instructions, permissions � tailored to agents with our capacities
we must largely act from the informed feelings that make up so muhc of our moral life: sympathy, respect, loyalty, fidelity
virtue ethics makes virtues not just important to, but also in some sense basic in, the moral structure
need not make virtues fundamental in the whole structure of values
but it places virtues deep in the moral structure
it makes the assesment of agents more basic than the assessment of actions
it explains what it is to act rightly in some situation in terms of doing what a virtuous person would do
our standard is a person with informed dispositions in wise balance
but if virtues are dispositions of the right sort, how do we decide on the right sort?
and how do we decide on the right balance between them?
answering these questions seems more fundamental to our moral structure than the virtues themselves
we are left much closer to common sense ethics than utilitarianism, deontology and virtue ethics claim
has this been a process of piecemeal intuition?
these three ethical systems constitute unrealistic programmes that cannot be carried out
the myth that there is always a morally right answer
human rights are best seen as protections of the values associated with personhood
but this alone doesn�t draw a determinate line
needs to be a manageable, socially effective claim on others
there are rational grounds for assessing laws and social standards, but they may not be entirely moral in content � might be social or psychological probabilities
often the other way round: moral norms are often highly indeterminate, and need some realistic picture of a satisfactory form of social greement added to them to give them shape
it is often society, through its conventions and convergences and decisions, that defines moral norms and so brings them into existence
moral norms are like positive laws in the modes of thought used to arrive at them (especially considerations of the limitations of agents, and the solutions to actual social problems)
there is no domain of the moral, i.e. a kind of thinking that appeals to purely moral considerations and is capable on its own of producing a body of determinate conclusions that can guide life
we must do without the all-pervasive background rationality that utilitarians and deontologists depend on to weigh the overall amount of good at stake or the relative stringency of the duties in play
at points, we have to fall back on natural sentiment, on a variety of well-entrenched but unsystematic norms, and on tradition
common-sense distinction between duty and supererogation (the performance of more than duty or circumstances require; doing more than is needed; spec. (RC Ch.) the performance of good works beyond what God commands or requires, as constituting a store of merit which the Church may dispense to others to make up for their deficiencies. Freq. in work of supererogation)
fixing a modest policy about killing = respecting, not promoting, the value of life
what forces shape these complex moral standards?
e.g. the protection of interests
but norms have domains, areas of application; the boundaries of their domains are settled not just by the interests at stake, but also by conventions, traditions and conceptions of the limits of agents
�
what about, in an extreme case, when there is no salient moral policy to choose in favour of norms?
direct/indirect utilitarianism? indirect = appeal to secondary/limited standards?
isn�t there something to be said about the lack of better alternatives in the trolley/cabin-boy/pot-hole cases?
difference between value and moral structure?
norm
A ������ n. 1 A standard, a type; what is expected or regarded as
normal; customary behaviour, appearance, etc. Freq. the norm. e19.